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Abstract. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) offer a statistical guarantee: if a
full manual tally of the paper ballots would show that the reported elec-
tion outcome is wrong, an RLA has a known minimum chance of leading
to a full manual tally. RLAs generally rely on random samples. Strati-
fied sampling—partitioning the population of ballots into disjoint strata
and sampling independently from the strata—may simplify logistics or
increase efficiency compared to simpler sampling designs, but makes risk
calculations harder. We present SUITE, a new method for conducting
RLAs using stratified samples. SUITE considers all possible partitions
of outcome-changing error across strata. For each partition, it combines
P -values from stratum-level tests into a combined P -value; there is no
restriction on the tests used in different strata. SUITE maximizes the
combined P -value over all partitions of outcome-changing error. The au-
dit can stop if that maximum is less than the risk limit. Voting systems
in some Colorado counties (comprising 98.2% of voters) allow auditors to
check how the system interpreted each ballot, which allows ballot-level
comparison RLAs. Other counties use ballot polling, which is less effi-
cient. Extant approaches to conducting an RLA of a statewide contest
would require major changes to Colorado’s procedures and software, or
would sacrifice the efficiency of ballot-level comparison. SUITE does not.
It divides ballots into two strata: those cast in counties that can conduct
ballot-level comparisons, and the rest. Stratum-level P -values are found
by methods derived here. The resulting audit is substantially more ef-
ficient than statewide ballot polling. SUITE is useful in any state with
a mix of voting systems or that uses stratified sampling for other rea-
sons. We provide an open-source reference implementation and exemplar
calculations in Jupyter notebooks.
Keywords: stratified sampling, nonparametric tests, Fisher’s combin-
ing function, sequential hypothesis tests, Colorado risk-limiting audits,
maximizing P -values over nuisance parameters, union-intersection test,
intersection-union test
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1 Introduction
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) of an election contest is a procedure that has a
known minimum chance of leading to a full manual tally of the ballots if the
electoral outcome according to that tally would differ from the reported outcome.
Outcome means the winner(s) (or, for instance, whether there is a runoff)—not
the numerical vote totals. RLAs require a durable, voter-verifiable record of
voter intent, such as paper ballots, and they assume that this audit trail is
sufficiently complete and accurate that a full hand tally would show the true
electoral outcome. That assumption is not automatically satisfied: a compliance
audit [16] is required to check whether the paper trail is trustworthy.
Current methods for risk-limiting audits are generally sequential hypothesis
testing procedures : they examine more ballots, or batches of ballots, until either
(i) there is strong statistical evidence that a full hand tabulation would confirm
the outcome, or (ii) the audit has led to a full hand tabulation, the result of
which should become the official result.
RLAs have been conducted in California, Colorado, Indiana, Ohio, Virginia,
and Denmark, and are required by law in Colorado (CRS 1-7-515) and Rhode
Island (SB 413A and HB 5704A).
The most efficient and transparent sampling design for risk-limiting au-
dits selects individual ballots uniformly at random, with or without replace-
ment [13]. Risk calculations for such samples can be made simple without sacri-
ficing rigor [14,6]. However, to audit contests that cross jurisdictional boundaries
then requires coordinating sampling in different counties, and may require dif-
ferent counties to use the lowest common denominator method for assessing risk
from the sample, which would not take full advantage of the capabilities of some
voting systems. For instance, any system that uses paper ballots as the official
record can conduct ballot-polling audits, while ballot-level comparison audits re-
quire systems to generate cast vote records that can be checked manually against
a human reading of the paper [5,6]. (These terms are described in Section 3.)
Stratified RLAs have been considered previously, primarily to conform with
legacy audit laws under which counties draw audit samples independently of
each other, but also to allow auditors to start the audit before all vote-by-mail
or provisional ballots have been tallied, by sampling independently from ballots
cast in person, by mail, and provisionally, as soon as subtotals for each group
are available [9,4]. However, extant methods address only a single approach to
auditing, batch-level comparisons, and only a particular test statistic.
Here, we introduce SUITE, a more general approach to conducting RLAs
using stratified samples. SUITE is a twist on intersection-union tests [7], which
represent the null hypothesis as the intersection of a number of simpler hypothe-
ses, and the alternative hypothesis as a union of their alternatives. In contrast,
here, the null is the union of simpler hypotheses, and the alternative is the
intersection of their alternatives. The approach involves finding the maximum
P -value over a vector of nuisance parameters that describe the simple hypothe-
ses, all allocations of tabulation error across strata for which a full count would
find a different electoral outcome than was reported. (A nuisance parameter is a
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property of the population that is not of direct interest, but that affects the prob-
ability distribution of the data. Overstatement is error that made the margin of
one or more winners over one or more losers appear larger than it really was.
The total overstatement across strata determines whether the reported outcome
is correct; the overstatements in individual strata are nuisance parameters that
affect the distribution of the audit sample.)
The basic building block for the method is testing whether the overstatement
error in a single stratum is greater than or equal to a quota. Fisher’s combining
function is used to merge P -values for tests in different strata into a single P -
value for the hypothesis that the overstatement in every stratum is greater than
or equal to its quota. If that hypothesis can be rejected for all stratum-level
quotas that could change the outcome—that is, if the maximum combined P -
value is sufficiently small—the audit can stop.
It is not actually necessary to consider all possible quotas: the P -value in-
volves a sum of monotonic functions, which allows us to find upper and lower
bounds everywhere using only values on a discrete grid. We present a numerical
procedure, implemented in Python, to find bounds on the maximum P -value
when there are two strata. The procedure can be generalized to more than two
strata.
Section 2 presents the new approach to stratified auditing. Section 3 illus-
trates the method by solving a problem pertinent to Colorado: combining bal-
lot polling in one stratum with ballot-level comparisons in another. This re-
quires straightforward modifications to the mathematics behind ballot polling
and ballot-level comparison to allow the overstatement to be compared to spec-
ified thresholds other than the overall contest margin; those modifications are
described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Section 4 gives numerical examples of sim-
ulated audits, using parameters intended to reflect how the procedure would
work in Colorado. We provide example software implementing the risk calcula-
tions for our recommended approach in Python Jupyter notebooks.3 Section 5
gives recommendations and considerations for implementation.
2 Stratified audits
Stratified sampling involves partitioning a population into non-overlapping groups
and drawing independent random samples from those groups. [9,4] developed
RLAs based on comparing stratified samples of batches of ballots to hand counts
of the votes in those batches: batch-level comparison RLAs, using a particular
test statistic. The method we develop here is more general and more flexible: it
can be used with any test statistic, and test statistics in different strata need
not be the same—which is key to combining audits of ballots cast using diverse
voting technologies.
Here and below, we consider auditing a single plurality contest at a time,
although the same sample can be used to audit more than one contest (and
3 See https://github.com/pbstark/CORLA18.
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super-majority contests), and there are ways of combining audits of different
contests into a single process [10,14]. We use terminology drawn from a number
of papers, notably [6].
An overstatement error is an error that caused the margin between any
reported winner and any reported loser to appear larger than it really was. An
understatement error is an error that caused the margin between every reported
winner and every reported loser to appear to be smaller than it really was.
Overstatements cast doubt on outcomes; understatements do not, even though
they are tabulation errors.
We use w to denote a reported winner and ℓ to denote a reported loser. The
total number of reported votes for candidate w is Vw and the total for candidate ℓ
is Vℓ. Thus Vw > Vℓ, since w is reported to have gotten more votes than ℓ.
Let Vwℓ ≡ Vw − Vℓ > 0 denote the contest-wide margin (in votes) of w over
ℓ. We have S strata. Let Vwℓ,s denote the margin (in votes) of reported winner
w over reported loser ℓ in stratum s. Note that Vwℓ,s might be negative in one
stratum, but
∑S
s=1 Vwℓ,s = Vwℓ > 0. Let Awℓ denote the margin (in votes) of
reported winner w over reported loser ℓ that a full hand count would show: the
actual margin, in contrast to the reported margin Vwℓ. Reported winner w really
beat reported loser ℓ if and only if Awℓ > 0. Define Awℓ,s to be the actual margin
(in votes) of w over ℓ in stratum s.
Let ωwℓ,s ≡ Vwℓ,s − Awℓ,s be the overstatement of the margin of w over
ℓ in stratum s. Reported winner w really beat reported loser ℓ if and only if
ωwℓ ≡
∑
s ωwℓ,s < Vwℓ.
An RLA is a test of the hypothesis that the outcome is wrong, that is, that w
did not really beat ℓ:
∑
s ωwℓ,s ≥ Vwℓ. The null is true if and only if there exists
some S-tuple of real numbers (λs)
S
s=1 with
∑
s λs = 1 such that ωwℓ,s ≥ λsVwℓ
for all s.4 Thus if we can reject the conjunction hypothesis ∩s{ωwℓ,s ≥ λsVwℓ}
at significance level α for all (λs) such that
∑
s λs = 1, we can stop the audit,
and the risk limit will be α.
2.1 Fisher’s combination method
Fix λ ≡ (λs)
S
s=1, with
∑
s λs = 1. To test the conjunction hypothesis that
stratum null hypotheses are true, that is, that ωwℓ,s ≥ λsVwℓ for all s, we use
Fisher’s combining function. Let ps(λs) be the P -value of the hypothesis ωwℓ,s ≥
λsVwℓ. If the null hypothesis is true, then
χ(λ) = −2
S∑
s=1
ln ps(λs) (1)
has a probability distribution that is dominated by the chi-square distribution
with 2S degrees of freedom.5 Fisher’s combined statistic will tend to be small
4 “If” is straightforward. For “only if,” suppose ωwℓ ≥ Vwℓ. Set λs =
ωwℓ,s∑
t ωwℓ,t
. Then
∑
s
λs = 1, and ωwℓ,s = λsωwℓ ≥ λsVwℓ for all s.
5 If the stratum-level tests had continuously distributed P -values, the distribution
would be exactly chi-square with 2S degrees of freedom, but if any of the P -values
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when all stratum-level null hypotheses are true. If any is false, then as the sample
size increases, Fisher’s combined statistic will tend to grow.
If, for all λ with
∑
s λs = 1, we can reject the conjunction hypothesis at
level α (i.e., if the minimum value of Fisher’s combined statistic over all λ is
larger than the 1 − α quantile of the chi-square distribution with 2S degrees of
freedom), the audit can stop.
If the audit is allowed to “escalate” in steps, increasing the sample size se-
quentially, then either the tests used in the separate strata have to be sequential
tests, or multiplicity needs to be taken into account, for instance by adjusting
the risk limit at each step. Otherwise, the overall procedure can have a risk limit
that is much larger than α. For examples of controlling for multiplicity when
using non-sequential testing procedures in an RLA, see [9,11].
The stratum-level P -value ps(λ) could be a P -value for the hypothesis ωwℓ,s ≥
λsVwℓ from any test procedure. We assume, however, that ps is based on a one-
sided test, and that the tests for different values of λ “nest” in the sense that if
a > b, then ps(a) > ps(b). This monotonicity is a reasonable requirement because
the evidence that the overstatement is greater than a should be weaker than the
evidence that the overstatement is greater than b, if a > b. In particular, this
monotonicity holds for the tests proposed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
One could use a function other than Fisher’s to combine the stratum-level
P -values into a P -value for the conjunction hypothesis, provided it satisfies these
properties (see [7]):
– the function is non-increasing in each argument and symmetric with respect
to rearrangements of the arguments
– the combining function attains its supremum when one of the arguments
approaches zero
– for every level α, the critical value of the combining function is finite and
strictly smaller than the function’s supremum.
For instance, one could use Liptak’s function, T =
∑
i Φ
−1(1− pi), or Tippett’s
function, T = maxi(1− pi).
Fisher’s function is convenient for this application because the tests in dif-
ferent strata are independent, so the chi-squared distribution dominates the dis-
tribution of χ(·) when the null hypothesis is true. If tests in different strata
were correlated, the null distribution of the combination function would need to
be calibrated by simulation; some other combining function might have better
properties than Fisher’s [7].
2.2 Maximizing Fisher’s combined P -value for S = 2
We now specialize to S = 2 strata. The set of λ = (λ1, λ2) such that
∑
s λs = 1 is
then a one-dimensional family: if λ1 = λ, then λ2 = 1−λ. For a given set of data,
has atoms when the null hypothesis is true, it is in general stochastically smaller.
This follows from a coupling argument along the lines of Theorem 4.12.3 in [3].
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finding the maximum P -value over all λ is thus a one-dimensional optimization
problem. We provide two software solutions to the problem.
The first approach approximates the maximum via a grid search, refining the
grid once the maximum has been bracketed. This is not guaranteed to find the
global maximum exactly, although it can approximate the maximum as closely
as one desires by refining the mesh, since the objective function is continuous.
The second, more rigorous approach uses bounds on Fisher’s combining func-
tion χ for all λ. (A lower bound on χ implies an upper bound on the P -value:
if, for all λ, the lower bound is larger than the 1−α quantile of the chi-squared
distribution with 4 degrees of freedom, the maximum P -value is no larger than
α.)
Some values of λ can be ruled out a priori, because (for instance) ωwℓ,s ≤
Vwℓ,s +Ns, where Ns is the number of ballots cast in stratum s, and thus
1−
Vwℓ,2 +N2
Vwℓ
≤ λ ≤
Vwℓ,1 +N1
Vwℓ
. (2)
Let λ− and λ+ be lower and upper bounds on λ.
Recall that ps(·) are monotonically increasing functions, so, as a function of
λ, p1(λ) increases monotonically and p2(1 − λ) decreases monotonically. Sup-
pose [a, b) ⊂ [λ−, λ+]. Then for all λ ∈ [a, b), −2 ln p1(λ) ≥ −2 ln p1(b) and
−2 ln p2(1− λ) ≥ −2 ln p2(1− a). Thus
χ(λ) = −2(ln p1(λ) + ln p2(1− λ)) ≥ −2(ln p1(b) + ln p2(1− a)) ≡ χ−[a, b). (3)
This gives a lower bound for χ on the interval [a, b); the corresponding upper
bound is χ(λ) ≤ −2(ln p1(a)+ ln p2(1− b)) ≡ χ+[a, b). Partitioning [λ−, λ+] into
a collection of intervals [ak, ak+1) and finding χ−[ak, ak+1) and χ+[ak, ak+1) for
each yields piecewise-constant lower and upper bounds for χ(λ).
If, for all λ ∈ [λ−, λ+], the lower bound on χ is larger than the 1−α quantile
of the chi-square distribution with 4 degrees of freedom, the audit can stop. On
the other hand, if for some λ ∈ [λ−, λ+], the upper bound is less than the 1− α
quantile of the chi-square distribution with 4 degrees of freedom, or if χ(ak) is
less than this quantile at any grid point {ak}, the sample size in one or both
strata needs to increase. If the lower bound is less than the 1 − α quantile on
some interval, but χ(ak) is above this quantile at every grid point {ak}, then
one should improve the lower bound by refining the grid and/or by increasing
the sample size in one or both strata.
3 Auditing cross-jurisdictional contests
As mentioned above, stratified sampling can simplify audit logistics by allowing
jurisdictions to sample ballots independently of each other, or by allowing a
single jurisdiction to sample independently from different collections of ballots
(e.g., vote-by-mail versus cast in person). SUITE allows stratified samples to
be combined into an RLA of contests that include ballots from more than one
stratum.
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We present an example where SUITE is helpful for a different reason: it
enables an RLA to take advantage of differences among voting systems to reduce
audit sample sizes, which solves a current problem in Colorado.
CRS 1-7-515 requires Colorado to conduct risk-limiting audits beginning in
2017. The first risk-limiting election audits under this statute were conducted
in November, 2017; the second were conducted in July, 2018.6 Counties cannot
audit contests that cross jurisdictional boundaries (cross-jurisdictional contests,
such as gubernatorial contests and most federal contests) on their own: margins
and risk limits apply to entire contests, not to the portion of a contest included
in a county. Colorado has not yet conducted an RLA of a cross-jurisdictional
contest, although it has performed RLA-like procedures on individual jurisdic-
tions’ portions of some cross-jurisdictional contests. To audit statewide elections
and contests that cross county lines, Colorado will need to implement new ap-
proaches and make some changes to its auditing software, RLATool.
Colorado’s voting systems are heterogeneous. Some counties (containing about
98% of active voters, as of this writing) have voting systems that export cast vote
records (CVRs) in a way that the paper ballot corresponding to each CVR can
be identified uniquely and retrieved. We call counties with such voting systems
CVR counties. In CVR counties, auditors can manually check the accuracy of
the voting system’s interpretation of individual ballots. In other counties (legacy
or no-CVR counties) there is no way to check the accuracy of the system’s
interpretation of voter intent for individual ballots.
Contests entirely contained in CVR counties can be audited using ballot-
level comparison audits [6], which compare CVRs to the auditors’ interpretation
of voter intent directly from paper ballots. Ballot-level comparison audits are
currently the most efficient approach to risk-limiting audits in that they require
examining fewer ballots than other methods do, when the outcome of the contest
under audit is in fact correct. Contests involving no-CVR counties can be audited
using ballot-polling audits [5,6], which generally require examining more ballots
than ballot-level comparison audits to attain the same risk limit.
Colorado’s challenge is to audit contests that include ballots cast in both
CVR counties and no-CVR counties. There is no literature on how to combine
ballot polling with ballot-level comparisons to audit cross-jurisdictional contests
that include voters in CVR counties and voters in no-CVR counties.7
Colorado could simply revert to ballot-polling audits for cross-jurisdictional
contests that include votes in no-CVR counties, but that would entail a loss of
efficiency. Alternatively, Colorado could use batch-level comparison audits, with
single-ballot batches in CVR counties and larger batches in no-CVR counties.8
The statistical theory for such audits has been worked out (see, e.g., [9,10,12,14]
6 See https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/RLA/2017RLABackground.html
7 See [8] for a different (Bayesian) approach to auditing contests that include both
CVR counties and no-CVR counties. In general, Bayesian audits are not risk-limiting.
8 Since so few ballots are cast in no-CVR counties, cruder approaches might work,
for instance, pretending that no-CVR counties had CVRs, but treating any ballot
sampled from a no-CVR county as if it had a 2-vote overstatement error. See [1].
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and Section A, below); indeed, this is the method that was used in several of Cal-
ifornia’s pilot audits, including the audit in Orange County, California. However,
batch-level comparison audits were found to be less efficient than ballot-polling
audits in these pilots [2].
Moreover, to use batch-level comparison audits in Colorado would require
major changes to RLATool, for reporting batch-level contest results prior to the
audit, for drawing the sample, for reporting audit findings, and for determining
when the audit can stop. The changes would include modifying data structures,
data uploads, random sampling procedures, and the county user interface. No-
CVR counties would also have to revise their audit procedures. Among other
things, they would need to report vote subtotals for physically identifiable groups
of ballots before the audit starts. No-CVR counties with voting systems that
can only report subtotals by precinct might have to make major changes to how
they handle ballots, for instance, sorting all ballots by precinct. These are large
changes.
We show here that SUITE makes possible a “hybrid” RLA that keeps the ad-
vantages of ballot-level comparison audits in CVR counties but does not require
major changes to how no-CVR counties audit, nor major changes to RLATool.
The key is to use stratified sampling with two strata: ballots cast in CVR coun-
ties and those cast in no-CVR counties.
In order to use Equation 1, we must develop stratum-level tests for the over-
statement error that are appropriate for the corresponding voting system. Sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2 describe these tests for overstatement in the CVR and no-CVR
strata, respectively.
3.1 Comparison audits of overstatement quotas
To use comparison auditing in the approach to stratification described above re-
quires extending previous work to test whether the overstatement error is greater
than or equal to λsVwℓ, rather than simply Vwℓ. Appendix A derives this gener-
alization for arbitrary batch sizes, including batches consisting of one ballot. The
derivation considers only a single contest, but the MACRO test statistic [10,14]
automatically extends the result to auditing any number of contests simultane-
ously. The derivation is for plurality contests, including “vote-for-k” plurality
contests. Majority and super-majority contests are a minor modification [9].9
3.2 Ballot-polling audits of overstatement quotas
To use the new stratification method with ballot polling requires a different
approach than [5] took: their approach tests whether w got a larger share of the
9 So are some forms of preferential and approval voting, such as Borda count, and pro-
portional representation contests, such as D’Hondt [15]. For a derivation of ballot-
level comparison risk-limiting audits for super-majority contests, see https://git
hub.com/pbstark/S157F17/blob/master/audit.ipynb. (Last visited 14 May 2018.)
Changes for IRV/STV are more complicated.
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votes than ℓ, but we need to test whether the margin in votes in the stratum is
greater than or equal to a threshold (namely, λsVwℓ). This introduces a nuisance
parameter, the number of ballots with votes for either w or ℓ. We address this
by maximizing the probability ratio in Wald’s Sequential Probability Ratio Test
[17] over all possible values of the nuisance parameter. Appendix B develops the
test.
4 Numerical examples
Jupyter notebooks containing calculations for hybrid stratified audits intended
to be relevant for Colorado are available at https://www.github.com/pbstark/
CORLA18.
hybrid-audit-example-1 contains two hypothetical examples. The first has
110, 000 cast ballots, of which 9.1% were in no-CVR counties. The diluted margin
(the margin in votes, divided by the total number of ballots cast) is 1.8%. In
94% of 10,000 simulations in which the reported results were correct, drawing
700 ballots from the CVR stratum and 500 ballots from the no-CVR stratum
(1,200 ballots in all) allowed SUITE to confirm the outcome at 10% risk. For
the remaining 6%, further expansion of the audits would have been necessary.
If it were possible to conduct a ballot-level comparison audit for the entire
contest, an RLA with risk limit 10% could terminate after examining 263 ballots
if it found no errors. A ballot-polling audit of the entire contest would have been
expected to examine about 14,000 ballots, more than 10% of ballots cast. The
hybrid audit is less efficient than a ballot-level comparison audit, but far more
efficient than a ballot-polling audit.
The second contest has 2 million cast ballots, of which 5% were cast in no-
CVR counties. The diluted margin is about 20%. The workload for SUITE at
5% risk is quite low: In 100% of 10,000 simulations in which the reported results
were correct, auditing 43 ballots from the CVR stratum and 15 ballots from
the no-CVR stratum would have confirmed the outcome. If it were possible to
conduct a ballot-level comparison audit for the entire contest, an RLA at risk
limit 5% could terminate after examining 31 ballots if it found no errors. The
additional work for the hybrid stratified audit is disproportionately in the no-
CVR counties.
A second notebook, hybrid-audit-example-2, illustrates the workflow for
SUITE for an election with 2 million ballots cast. The reported margin is just
over 1%, but the reported winner and reported loser are actually tied in both
strata. The risk limit is 5%. For a sample of 500 ballots from the CVR stratum
and 1000 ballots from the no-CVR stratum, the maximum combined P -value is
over 25%, so the audit cannot stop there.
A third notebook, fisher combined pvalue, illustrates the numerical meth-
ods used to check whether the maximum combined P -value is below the risk
limit. It includes code for the tests in the two strata, for the lower and upper
bounds λ− and λ+ for λ, for evaluating Fisher’s combining function on a grid,
and for computing bounds on the P -value via Equation 3.
10 K. Ottoboni et al.
5 Discussion
We present SUITE, a new class of procedures for RLAs based on stratified
random sampling. SUITE is agnostic about the capability of voting equipment in
different strata, unlike previous methods, which require batch-level comparisons
in every stratum. SUITE allows arbitrary tests to be used in different strata; if
those tests are sequentially valid, then the overall RLA is sequential. (Otherwise,
multiplicity adjustments might be needed if one wants an audit that escalates
in stages. See [9,11] for two approaches.)
Like other RLA methods, SUITE poses auditing as a hypothesis test. The null
hypothesis is a union over all partitions of outcome-changing error across strata.
The hypothesis is rejected if the maximum P -value over all such partitions is
sufficiently small. Each possible partition yields an intersection hypothesis, tested
by combining P -values from different strata using Fisher’s combining function
(or a suitable replacement).
Among other things, the new approach solves a current problem in Colorado:
how to conduct RLAs of contests that cross jurisdictional lines, such as statewide
contests and many federal contests.
We give numerical examples in Jupyter notebooks that can be modified to
estimate the workload for different contest sizes, margins, and risk limits. In our
numerical experiments, the new method requires auditing far fewer ballots than
previous approaches would.
A Comparison tests for an overstatement quota
A.1 Notation
– W : the set of reported winners of the contest
– L: the set of reported losers of the contest
– Ns ballots were cast in stratum s. (The contest might not appear on all Ns
ballots.)
– P “batches” of ballots are in stratum s. A batch contains one or more ballots.
Every ballot in stratum s is in exactly one batch.
– np: number of ballots in batch p. Ns =
∑P
p=1 np.
– vpi ∈ {0, 1}: reported votes for candidate i in batch p
– api ∈ {0, 1}: actual votes for candidate i in batch p. If the contest does not
appear on any ballot in batch p, then api = 0.
– Vwℓ,s ≡
∑P
p=1(vpw − vpℓ): Reported margin in stratum s of reported winner
w ∈ W over reported loser ℓ ∈ L, in votes.
– Vwℓ: overall reported margin in votes of reported winner w ∈ W over reported
loser ℓ ∈ L for the entire contest (not just stratum s)
– V ≡ minw∈W,ℓ∈L Vwℓ: smallest reported overall margin in votes between any
reported winner and reported loser
– Awℓ,s ≡
∑P
p=1(apw − apℓ): actual margin in votes in the stratum of reported
winner w ∈ W over reported loser ℓ ∈ L
– Awℓ: actual margin in votes of reported winner w ∈ W over reported loser
ℓ ∈ L for the entire contest (not just in stratum s)
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A.2 Reduction to maximum relative overstatement
If the contest is entirely contained in stratum s, then the reported winners of
the contest are the actual winners if
min
w∈W,ℓ∈L
Awℓ,s > 0.
Here, we address the case that the contest may include a portion outside the
stratum. To combine independent samples in different strata, it is convenient to
be able to test whether the net overstatement error in a stratum is greater than
or equal to a given threshold.
Instead of testing that condition directly, we will test a condition that is
sufficient but not necessary for the inequality to hold, to get a computationally
simple test that is still conservative (i.e., the level is not larger than its nominal
value).
For every winner, loser pair (w, ℓ), we want to test whether the overstatement
error is greater than or equal to some threshold, generally one tied to the reported
margin between w and ℓ. For instance, for a hybrid stratified audit, we set the
threshold to be λsVwℓ.
We want to test whether
P∑
p=1
(vpw − apw − vpℓ + apℓ)/Vwℓ ≥ λs.
The maximum of sums is not larger than the sum of the maxima; that is,
max
w∈W,ℓ∈L
P∑
p=1
(vpw−apw−vpℓ+apℓ)/Vwℓ ≤
P∑
p=1
max
w∈W,ℓ∈L
(vpw−apw−vpℓ+apℓ)/Vwℓ.
Define
ep ≡ max
w∈Wℓ∈L
(vpw − apw − vpℓ + apℓ)/Vwℓ.
Then no reported margin is overstated by a fraction λs or more if
E ≡
P∑
p=1
ep < λs.
Thus if we can reject the hypothesis E ≥ λs, we can conclude that no pairwise
margin was overstated by as much as a fraction λs.
Testing whether E ≥ λs would require a very large sample if we knew nothing
at all about ep without auditing batch p: a single large value of ep could make
E arbitrarily large. But there is an a priori upper bound for ep. Whatever the
reported votes vpi are in batch p, we can find the potential values of the actual
votes api that would make the error ep largest, because api must be between 0
and np, the number of ballots in batch p:
vpw − apw − vpℓ + apℓ
Vwℓ
≤
vpw − 0− vpℓ + np
Vwℓ
.
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Hence,
ep ≤ max
w∈W,ℓ∈L
vpw − vpℓ + np
Vwℓ
≡ up. (4)
Knowing that ep ≤ up might let us conclude reliably that E < λs by exam-
ining only a small number of batches—depending on the values {up}
P
p=1 and on
the values of {ep} for the audited batches.
To make inferences about E, it is helpful to work with the taint tp ≡
ep
up
≤ 1.
Define U ≡
∑P
p=1 up. Suppose we draw batches at random with replacement,
with probability up/U of drawing batch p in each draw, p = 1, . . . , P . (Since
up ≥ 0, these are all positive numbers, and they sum to 1, so they define a
probability distribution on the P batches.)
Let Tj be the value of tp for the batch p selected in the jth draw. Then
{Tj}
n
j=1 are IID, P{Tj ≤ 1} = 1, and
ET1 =
P∑
p=1
up
U
tp =
1
U
P∑
p=1
up
ep
up
=
1
U
P∑
p=1
ep = E/U.
Thus E = UET1. So, if we have strong evidence that ET1 < λs/U , we have
strong evidence that E < λs.
This approach can be simplified even further by noting that up has a simple
upper bound that does not depend on vpi. At worst, the reported result for batch
p shows np votes for the “least-winning” apparent winner of the contest with
the smallest margin, but a hand interpretation would show that all np ballots
in the batch had votes for the runner-up in that contest. Since Vwℓ ≥ V ≡
minw∈W,ℓ∈L Vwℓ and 0 ≤ vpi ≤ np,
up = max
w∈W,ℓ∈L
vpw − vpℓ + np
Vwℓ
≤ max
w∈W,ℓ∈L
np − 0 + np
Vwℓ
≤
2np
V
.
Thus if we use 2np/V in lieu of up, we still get conservative results. (We also
need to re-define U to be the sum of those upper bounds.) An intermediate, still
conservative approach would be to use this upper bound for batches that consist
of a single ballot, but use the sharper bound (4) when np > 1. Regardless, for
the new definition of up and U , {Tj}
n
j=1 are IID, P{Tj ≤ 1} = 1, and
ET1 =
P∑
p=1
up
U
tp =
1
U
P∑
p=1
up
ep
up
=
1
U
P∑
p=1
ep = E/U.
So, if we have evidence that ET1 < λs/U , we have evidence that E < λs.
A.3 Testing ET1 ≥ λs/U
A variety of methods are available to test whether ET1 < λs/U . One particu-
larly elegant sequential method is based on Wald’s Sequential Probability Ratio
Test (SPRT) [17]. Harold Kaplan pointed out this method on a website that
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no longer exists. A derivation of this Kaplan-Wald method is in Appendix A
of [15]; to apply the method here, take t = λs in their equation 18. A different
sequential method, the Kaplan-Markov method (also due to Harold Kaplan), is
given in [12].
B Ballot-polling tests for an overstatement quota
In this section, we derive a ballot-polling test of the hypothesis that the margin
(in votes) in a single stratum is greater than or equal to a threshold c.
B.1 Wald’s SPRT with a nuisance parameter
Consider a single stratum s containing Ns ballots, of which Nw,s have a vote for
w but not for ℓ, Nℓ,s have a vote for ℓ but not for w, and Nu,s = Ns −Nw,s −
Nℓ,s have votes for both w and ℓ or neither w nor ℓ, including undervotes and
invalid ballots. Ballots are drawn sequentially without replacement, with equal
probability of selecting each as-yet-unselected ballot in each draw.
We want to test the compound hypothesis that Nw,s −Nℓ,s ≤ c against the
alternative that Nw,s = Vw,s, Nℓ,s = Vℓ,s, and Nu,s = Vu,s, with Vw,s − Vℓ,s > c.
The values Vw,s, Vℓ,s, and Vu,s are the reported results for stratum s (or values
related to those reported results; see [5]). In this problem, Nu,s (equivalently,
Nw,s +Nℓ,s) is a nuisance parameter: we care about Nw,s −Nℓ,s.
Let Xk be w, ℓ, or u according to whether the ballot selected on the kth
draw shows a vote for w but not ℓ, ℓ but not w, or something else. Let Wn ≡∑n
k=1 1Xk=w; and define Ln and Un analogously.
The probability of a given data sequence X1, . . . , Xn under the alternative
hypothesis is
∏Wn−1
i=0 (Vw,s − i)
∏Ln−1
i=0 (Vℓ,s − i)
∏Un−1
i=0 (Vu,s − i)∏n−1
i=0 (Ns − i)
.
If Ln ≥ Wn − cn/Ns, the data obviously do not provide evidence against the
null, so we suppose that Ln < Wn − cn/Ns, in which case, the element of the
null that will maximize the probability of the observed data has Nw,s−c = Nℓ,s.
Under the null hypothesis, the probability of X1, . . . , Xn is
∏Wn−1
i=0 (Nw,s − i)
∏Ln−1
i=0 (Nw,s − c− i)
∏Un−1
i=0 (Nu,s − i)∏n
i=0(Ns − i)
,
for some value Nw,s and the corresponding Nu,s = Ns−2Nw,s+c. How large can
that probability be under the null? The probability under the null is maximized
by any integer x ∈ {max(Wn, Ln + c), . . . , (N − Un)/2} that maximizes
Wn−1∏
i=0
(x − i)
Ln−1∏
i=0
(x− c− i)
Un−1∏
i=0
(Ns − 2x+ c− i).
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The logarithm is monotonic, so any maximizer x∗ also maximizes
f(x) =
Wn−1∑
i=0
ln(x − i) +
Ln−1∑
i=0
ln(x− c− i) +
Un−1∑
i=0
ln(Ns − 2x+ c− i).
The first two terms on the right increase monotonically with x and the last term
decreases monotonically with x. This yields bounds without having to evaluate
f everywhere. Suppose y < z. Then for all integer x between y and z,
f(x) ≤
Wn−1∑
i=0
ln(z − i) +
Ln−1∑
i=0
ln(z − c− i) +
Un−1∑
i=0
ln(Ns − 2y + c− i).
The optimization problem can be solved using a branch and bound approach.
For instance, start by evaluating
f+(x) ≡
Wn−1∑
i=0
ln(x− i) +
Ln−1∑
i=0
ln(x − c− i)
and
f−(x) ≡
Un−1∑
i=0
ln(Ns − 2x+ c− i)
at max(Wn, Ln + c), (Ns − Un)/2, and their midpoint, to get the values of
f = f+ + f− at those three points, along with upper bounds on f on the
ranges between them. At stage j, we have evaluated f , f+, and f− at j points
x1 < x2 < . . . < xj , and we have upper bounds on f on the j − 1 ranges Rm =
{xm, xm + 1, . . . , xm+1} between those points. Let Um be the upper bound on
f(x) for x ∈ Rm. Suppose that for some h, f(xh) = max
j
m=1 Um. Then x
∗ = xh
is a global maximizer of f . If there is some Um > maxi f(xi), then subdivide the
range with the largest Um, calculate f , f
+, and f− at the new point, and repeat.
This algorithm must terminate by identifying a global maximizer x∗ after a finite
number of steps.
A conservative P -value for the null hypothesis after n items have been drawn
is thus
Pn =
∏Wn−1
i=0 (x
∗ − i)
∏Ln−1
i=0 (x
∗ − c− i)
∏Un−1
i=0 (Ns − 2x
∗ + c− i)
∏Wn−1
i=0 (Vw,s − i)
∏Ln−1
i=0 (Vℓ,s − i)
∏Un−1
i=0 (Vu,s − i)
.
Because the test is built on Wald’s SPRT, the sample can expand sequentially
and (if the null hypothesis is true) the chance that Pn < p is never larger than
p. That is, Pr{infn Pn < p} ≤ p if the null is true.
A Jupyter notebook implementing this approach is given in https://github.
com/pbstark/CORLA18.
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